4.3 The Facts of the Case
In addressing the pertinent issues raised, the UK Admiralty Court conducted a thorough examination of the case's facts, with particular emphasis on the passage plan and the surrounding navigational circumstances. The sequence of events leading to the grounding can be briefly summarized as follows:
Prior to departure from Xiamen, the second officer prepared a passage plan for the voyage from Xiamen to the port of Hong Kong.(1)Libra [2019], 25 The passage plan was expressed through two documents: a “passage plan document” and the vessel’s working chart.(2)Libra [2021], 11 The relevant chart for the vessel's departure from Xiamen was British Admiralty chart no. 3449 ("BA 3449").(3) Ibid
Importantly, the vessel had onboard Notice to Mariners 6274(P)/10 (“NM 6274”), which included the following warning, “Numerous depths less than the charted exist within, and in the approaches to Xiamen Gang.” Furthermore, NM 6274 also advised that the "least depth" within the buoyed fairway from the port to the open sea was 14 meters at low tide, ensuring sufficient depth for the vessel at all times.(4) Ibid, 13 The crew, however, neglected to annotate BA 3449 with a specific reference to the uncharted depths warning, and they also failed to include it in the passage plan document.(5) Ibid
The passage plan prepared for the vessel`s departure from Xiamen prescribed a course following the buoyed fairway. The master, however, decided to divert from the intended route, leaving the buoyed fairway. It was reported that, “the master's stated reason, on the very day of the grounding incident, for leaving buoy 14-1 to port was that he had in mind having been told by VTS on the inward passage that there was shallow water "ahead on the East of the channel".(6)Libra [2019], 46 The decision to divert from the intended route ultimately resulted in the vessel running aground on an unchartered shoal about four cables west of the buoyed fairway.